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Maximising Influence in an Uncertain World: Learning from 
traditional British foreign policy strategies 
 
 
Dr Sarah Tzinieris 
 
Research Fellow, King’s College London 
 
With the UK’s withdrawal from the EU reaching a critical point, it is useful to revisit traditional  
strategies of British foreign policy. The Brexit negotiations are the toughest in a generation, 
with major ramifications for the economy, politics and public life. Notwithstanding the 
government’s assurances that its deal is the best the UK can achieve, the acrimony in British 
politics is raising the prospect of a constitutional crisis. Whilst British governments have dealt 
with turmoil in the past, the scenario of the UK leaving the EU without a deal would signal a 
break in the way that foreign policy has historically been formulated.  
 
In the modern age, British governments have frequently needed to respond to the 
reconfiguration of strategic alliances and, since the two world wars, the corresponding loss of 
empire. In the post-war period, successive governments have attempted to counter the steady 
decline in global influence by maximising available opportunities – often pursued within 
multilateral alliances or overlapping bilateral goals. Pragmatism over sentiment, economic 
interests over ideology, and shared interests over isolationism have tended to characterise 
the UK’s relations overseas. British foreign policy strategies can be conceptualised as three 
typologies, as detailed below. 
  
1. ‘Punching above its weight’ 
 
The boxing metaphor, ‘punching above its weight’ – foreign policy lexicon coined by former 
foreign secretary Douglas Hurd – is often used to describe the UK’s role within global affairs 
beyond its actual capacity for influence. By the end of World War Two, Churchill had realised 
Britain’s former imperial power could no longer be sustained. The government had to come to 
terms with limiting Britain’s global reach to mitigate even greater losses. A number of overseas 
territories were granted independence, most joining the Commonwealth. The British economy 
was also now dependent on American loans and investment, and foreign and defence policy 
became generally aligned with Washington. 
 
Despite the austerity and pragmatism of the post-war period, it was difficult to accept Britain 
was no longer a ‘great power’. Antony Eden’s dismal failure to regain Suez in 1956 followed 
by Washington’s economic reprimand had a major bearing on future overseas engagement. 
Although it was widely acknowledged that Britain’s colonial past was over, governments during 
the Cold War endeavoured to arrest the process of decline by developing a nuclear deterrent 
and sustaining military capabilities on a vast geographical scale. Other features of ‘punching 
above its weight’ included Britain’s leadership in the Commonwealth and growing influence 
within the European Communities (now the EU). The UK also vehemently defended its 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a privilege that worked through the international 
system more broadly. 
 
The UK was relatively cushioned from geopolitical pressures at the end of the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, domestic turmoil prevented John Major’s government from undertaking any 
comprehensive re-evaluation of foreign policy objectives in the new world order. The Tony 
Blair government attempted to do so with its 2003 white paper, ‘UK International Priorities: A 
Strategy for the FCO’. Yet, in the wake of Iraq, the paper was more focused on the threat of 
terrorism and bridging Euro-Atlantic security differences than developing a broader strategy. 
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The ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ (SDSR) of 2010 under the coalition government 
of David Cameron, together with the 2015 SDSR, were more successful in conceptualising 
the immediacy of security challenges faced by the UK. However, austerity underscored painful 
choices in defence spending and proposed solutions focused on responding to events, rather 
than shaping favourable outcomes in international affairs.  
  
Part of the problem stems from the UK’s military and security obligations continuing to outstrip 
actual capacity. Meanwhile, British officials have been ineffective at planning ahead, at least 
in a formal sense – leading to a tendency to reactive policy-making. Governments have also 
gratuitously played up Britain’s military reputation to emphasise great power status and 
independence, especially under Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. What is striking about the 
metaphor ‘punching above its weight’ is the sense of national pride tinged with insecurity that 
Britain does not quite deserve its place at the top table.  
 
 
2. The ‘three circles’ doctrine 
 
Churchill provided a vision of Britain as inhabiting ‘three majestic circles’ of international 
influence: the Commonwealth, transatlantic relations, and Europe. By playing a role in all three 
arenas, Britain might sustain relationships with multiple allies to exercise its interests. Notably 
Churchill believed that, of the three, Britain gained most from the transatlantic relationship and 
least from the European. A precedent was set for succeeding governments to prioritise 
relations with Washington over those in the Commonwealth and Europe. Churchill’s ‘three 
circles’ doctrine advocated employing international frameworks of cooperation – today known 
as multilateralism.  
 
Into the post-Cold War period, the global system became increasingly interdependent and 
Britain was reliant on the behaviour of other states to secure its foreign policy objectives. 
Globalisation also limited the capacity of governments to take autonomous decisions over the 
economy. In view of diminishing global reach, the UK had a direct stake in employing 
multilateral frameworks to realise global interests and took these seriously, often more so than 
other states. However, it was only after Labour came to power in 1997 that multilateralism, 
globalism and Europeanism became foreign policy priorities. Blair’s foreign secretary Robin 
Cook advocated for the UK to feature prominently in all multilateral fora. A legacy of this 
thinking was that British officials became better equipped at lobbying through the operational 
aspects of multilateral arrangements.  
 
During the Blair years, the UK’s Atlanticist loyalties ultimately superseded commitments to 
multilateralism, confirmed by controversial unilateral action in Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, the 
UK remained committed to multilateral fora, especially where they related to trade and 
overseas development aid (ODA). Indeed, the UK took a leading role from the late 1990s in 
promoting best practices in the management and disbursement of ODA. The EU provided 
more ODA than any other donor, and as a relatively powerful member state, the UK was well-
placed to influence negotiations over development and enhance its presence on the ground. 
Yet in so doing, the Blair government sometimes exploited multilateral fora for unilateral 
purposes.  
 
3. The ‘bridging’/‘pivotal’ strategy 
 
By the mid-twentieth century, the three circles doctrine developed into a more explicit strategy 
to prioritise relations with Washington and Europe (whilst the Commonwealth dimension 
became somewhat ceremonial). After the 1956 Suez debacle, Britain was forced to come to 
terms with its inability to act without US support. This was the origin of the ‘bridging’ approach 
in British foreign policy. The conclusion was Britain should never again come into open conflict 
with Washington, but also that it should retain a stake in the European project – even 
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countenancing this might evolve into regional integration. Rather than choosing between 
Europe and the US, Britain could maximise strategic influence by acting as a ‘bridge’ between 
them. 
 
The Thatcher, Major and Blair governments alike employed the bridging rhetoric to maximise 
strategic influence within global affairs. Notwithstanding her tough negotiating style, Thatcher 
did not believe a choice was necessary between the US and Europe. And despite his 
difficulties in engaging Washington, Major declared “to be straddled between these two 
economic and political giants has served us well”. Blair came into office with the explicit 
intention to place Britain “at the heart of Europe” and to “deepen” relations in Washington. 
Blair subsequently started identifying Britain as a ‘pivotal power’. Yet the ambiguities of his 
position were apparent after Blair boldly committed to European defence integration at St 
Malo in December 1998 but then supported controversial US-led airstrikes in Iraq a few weeks 
later.  
 
 
Concluding thoughts  
 
British allusions to ‘punching above its weight’ or acting as bridge in international affairs often 
seem simplistic, even solipsistic. Contemporary prime ministers – most recently, Theresa May 
with her post-Brexit vision – have endeavoured to make Britain a global power once again. 
Such ambitions perhaps signify misperceptions of the UK’s global standing – unable to accept 
declining influence, and also that the world has become increasingly interdependent. 
Nevertheless, the UK’s decline since World War Two has been relative. The UK remains one 
of the world’s most powerful states, with the fifth largest economy, veto power on the UN 
Security Council, leadership in the commonwealth, a nuclear deterrence, and wealth of soft 
power. 
  
Difficulties arise from ambiguity and inconsistency in British foreign policy. When faced with 
global crises, the UK has often prioritised Atlanticism – ultimately resulting in London doing 
Washington’s bidding in Europe. Suspicions from European partners linger over Britain’s 
underlying motivations when engaging in EU negotiations, leaving the UK as the perpetual 
‘awkward partner’. For its part, Washington has seldom accommodated British interests when 
devising strategy, even when British parliamentary or public opinion has been on the line. 
Maintaining a bridging role also entails a tricky balancing act in the face of vociferous 
resistance to Brussels from domestic constituents.  
 
Nevertheless, navigating the complex and overlapping spheres of Europeanism, Atlanticism 
and multilateral fora to exercise its interests is the most viable option for the UK in a globalised 
world with new security threats, not least the resurgence of Russia. Salient in decision-making 
over Brexit, rather than privileging international partners over others, the UK would be advised 
to adopt a more strategic approach to foreign policy, which seeks to shape international affairs, 
whilst building in contingencies and not overcommitting outside traditional spheres of 
influence. As Sir Lawrence Freedman puts this in his seminal work Strategy, “It is about getting 
more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest”.  
 
